Shadow copy deletion

Severity criticalWindowsSingle eventstablewindows.impact.shadow_copy_deletion · v1.0.0

Detects destruction of recovery data — Volume Shadow Copies, system-state backups, or the Windows recovery environment (vssadmin / wmic shadowcopy…

What it detects

Detects destruction of recovery data — Volume Shadow Copies, system-state backups, or the Windows recovery environment (vssadmin / wmic shadowcopy delete, wbadmin delete, bcdedit recovery tampering). Wiping the ability to restore is a hallmark step ransomware takes immediately before or after encryption, and is high-signal on its own.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

  • T1490Inhibit System Recovery· Impact

False positives and triage

Backup software and administrators occasionally prune or resize shadow storage. A read (vssadmin list shadows) is never flagged. Deleting ALL shadows, deleting the backup catalog, or disabling the recovery environment on a workstation is a strong ransomware precursor — correlate with mass file modification and the invoking account.

The rule

Declarative YAML read by the detection engine — data, never executed. Confidence 85%. Source: rules/windows/shadow_copy_deletion.yaml, licensed under the Apache License 2.0.

id: windows.impact.shadow_copy_deletion
version: 1.0.0
status: stable
severity: critical
confidence: 0.85
platforms: [windows]
mitre_techniques: [T1490]
description: |
  Detects destruction of recovery data — Volume Shadow Copies, system-state backups, or
  the Windows recovery environment (vssadmin / wmic shadowcopy delete, wbadmin delete,
  bcdedit recovery tampering). Wiping the ability to restore is a hallmark step ransomware
  takes immediately before or after encryption, and is high-signal on its own.
match:
  event_category_any: [process, script]
  command_line_contains_any:
    - "vssadmin delete shadows"
    - "vssadmin.exe delete shadows"
    - "delete shadows /all"
    - "shadowcopy delete"
    - "win32_shadowcopy"
    - "resize shadowstorage"
    - "wbadmin delete catalog"
    - "delete systemstatebackup"
    - "recoveryenabled no"
    - "bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures"
false_positive_guidance: |
  Backup software and administrators occasionally prune or resize shadow storage. A read
  (vssadmin list shadows) is never flagged. Deleting ALL shadows, deleting the backup
  catalog, or disabling the recovery environment on a workstation is a strong ransomware
  precursor — correlate with mass file modification and the invoking account.

Related detections

Run this rule on your own logs — offline

KIROSEC runs this rule and the rest of the library over Windows, Linux, macOS and cloud audit logs on the analyst's own machine. Every alert links to the events that raised it, and nothing leaves the device.

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